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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper identifies four economic tendencies that shaped the development of the 
international recorded music industry since 1945: the importance of endogenous sunk costs led 
to a quality race; the fact that marginal revenue equalled marginal profit led to extreme vertical 
integration; the quasi-public good character of musicits non-diminishability but partial 
excludabilityled to a sharply unequal income distribution among stars and the pioneering of 
new business models to transform consumer into producer surplus; and finally, the project-
based character of music production led to decentralised agglomeration. What can be 
characterised as rights-based multinationals emerged as a response to these forces. They 
married extreme vertical integration and a portfolio of A&R labels having limited economies of 
scale and scope, with a global distribution and marketing machine. This paper tries to explain 
how they emerged and how they can explain increasing industrial concentration in the face of 
sharp growth of the market and of musical diversity. 
A revised version of this paper will be forthcoming in Popular Music History 
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1. Introduction 
After the Second World War, the recorded music industry grew rapidly. Demand 
increased sharply, bolstered by the emergence of more affluent and more highly educated 
young people with more leisure time. On the supply side, new recording formats, more music 
on radio after television, a proliferation of radio stations and musical styles sharply improved the 
perceived quality of recorded music that was available. Despite an enormous market growth and 
despite a sharp increase in musical diversity, a handful of multinationals proved best able to 
arbitrate between the supply and demand factors and came to dominate the international music 
industry. 
This paper examines this remarkable post-war transformation of the music industry, and 
draws inferences by analysing changes in the very long-run. It aims to address three key 
questions: 
• What forces shaped the long-run development of the recorded music industry since 
1945 and how can we understand these forces? 
• How did organisations emerge out of this change, chaos, disruption and turmoil, how 
can we characterise them and how did they work? 
• How can we explain the joint puzzle of increasing long-run industrial concentration 
going hand in hand with, first, a sharply growing market, and second, with increasing 
diversity, product differentiation and market segmentation? 
These questions are important because they allow us to investigate an intriguing link 
between general changes in the business environment and how they get expressed in 
organisations. Often, separate papers deal with a historical analysis of the general economic 
forces on the one hand, and the development of organisations on the other. This paper tries to 
look at the interactions. Second, little has been written within economic and business history on 
the music industries, while they formed a fast-growing internationally integrated sector, whose 
importance to society seems to have been far larger than its growing output share.3 Third, the 
puzzle of concentration and diversity is a much studied one, and economic history might help 
increase our knowledge of the puzzle. The paradox of a sharply growing market and increasing 
concentration in the music industry has been far less studied, but appears at least as important. 
The general mechanism has been discussed extensively in economics.4 Fourth, an overarching 
economic conceptual framework may help us understand the music industry’s evolution and see 
it with new eyes. 
In this paper we will not deal with the effect of internet technology on the recorded 
music industry in the last ten years or so, on which many papers have been written already. 
Also, we will focus on the music industry internationally, with an emphasis on the US market, as 
it was by far the largest music market in the world. Methodologically, this paper is based on 
historical research on the history of multinationals in the recorded music industry and the history 
of the industry in general. Also, since it focuses on a long-run analysis, over more than five 
decades since 1945, it tries to explain shifts in the very long-run, not shifts that happened in a 
                                            
3 Exceptions are Jones (1985); Mabry (1990); Martland (1992); Bakker (2006); Bakker (2010); Gourvish 
and Tennent (2010); Coopey (2011). 
4 See below. 
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few years. Third, the paper will use both a qualitative and a descriptive-quantitative approach. 
Finally, the inferences in the paper are largely based on economic concepts and reasoning. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: first we will identify and discuss four economic 
tendencies that shaped the development of the music industry since 1945, subsequently we will 
examine how these tendencies led to the emergence and survival of multinationals using a 
rights-based organisational structure, third we will examine in detail how they organised their 
A&R activities in a federated structure. Finally, we will try to infer from our historical 
investigation the essence of the rights-based multinational.  
 
2. Underlying economic tendencies driving the industry’s evolution 
This section identifies four major economic tendencies that drove the evolution of the 
recorded music industry since 1945 and shaped the climate in which the rights-based 
multinationals emerged. This paper argues that these tendencies created new profit 
opportunities that were spotted first by a few companies which, while developing the business 
model that would allow them to transform these opportunities into profits, developed into 
rights-based multinationals. Thus, the rights-based music multinationals arose as the result of 
entrepreneurs arbitraging the opportunities that emerged through the rapidly changing business 
environment. The question why just a few organisations managed to perform this arbitration 
successfully  is examined in the subsequent two sections, which discuss the organisational 
implications of these four tendencies. 
The four major tendencies that we have identified are: the importance of endogenous 
sunk costs, the fact that marginal revenues largely equalled marginal profits, recorded music’s 
quasi-public good character and, finally, its project-based nature.5 These currents have 
determined the industry’s evolution since 1945. For each of these four trends, this section 
identifies the underlying economic characteristic, its dynamic implication and then assesses how 
the latter expressed itself historically. 
First, a key economic characteristic of the music industry was that many costs were 
endogenous sunk costs: the costs were incurred once and could not be recovered when leaving 
the industry, and the entrepreneurs could decide the level of costs to incur: this level not being 
dictated by technology. Examples are marketing, recording and A&R expenditures and, outside 
the music industry, advertising and research and development (R&D).6  
The dynamic implication of endogenous sunk costs is what we call a quality race, a 
market phase in which some firms escalate their sunk outlays in order to obtain a larger market 
share. While in other industries the lower bound to industrial concentration may fall to zero as 
the market size increases, because there is ‘room’ for more companies to enter the market, in 
some endogenous sunk costs industries concentration is bounded from below when market size 
grows to infinity, and does not converge to zero.7 In other words, concentration goes up, not 
down, as the market gets larger. 
                                            
5 A more general discussion of these four tendencies in the creative industries in general can be found in 
Bakker (2012). 
6 Bakker (2005). 
7 Sutton (1991; 1998). 
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Market growth in such industries raises profits for any given quality level, making room 
for new entrants, but also stimulating firms to raise their R&D investments e.g. film production 
outlays, to improve their quality level: while the marginal cost of an increase in R&D-spending is 
unchanged, the marginal benefit from it is now higher, leading to higher fixed sunk costs and 
limiting the number of firms as the market tends to infinity. Which of the two effects has the 
upper hand depends on the distribution of the willingness-to-pay and shape of R&D-costs 
associated with quality improvements.8 
Quality races such as the rise of the feature film in the mid-1910s have happened at 
various points in the entertainment industry’s development. In the 1970s, for example, a new 
quality race started in motion pictures when the ailing Hollywood studios focused on 
blockbuster movies that were heavily marketed and advertised on television, starting with Jaws 
in 1975. In the music industry a quality race was triggered in the 1950s by a confluence of 
largely exogenous demand and supply factors. After the quality race had started, the race in 
itself started to stimulate further development of demand and supply.  
Demand for recorded music had increased dramatically in almost every part of the world 
since 1945. This trend was largely driven by the increasing affluence, education, and leisure time 
of teenagers. On the supply side, new recording formats, such as the long-playing record (LP), 
the 45rpm, audiotape and stereo were introduced. General interest lowest-common-
denominator radio programs moved to television, which led, first, to more music being played 
on radio, and second to more market segmentation, with many radio stations focusing on 
distinctive musical styles. The increasing variety of these musical styles was the third supply 
factor affecting the quality race. 
On the demand side, then, the reward for offering a higher perceived quality had 
increased substantially, while the three supply side factors lowered the cost of generating, 
delivering and marketing this increased quality. The resulting profit opportunity led 
entrepreneurs to sharply increase expenditure on Artists and Repertoire (A&R), discovering, 
developing, recording and promoting talent. This happened both through vertical product 
differentiation, with entrepreneurs and firms spending heavily on buying and developing 
promising or already popular acts, and through horizontal product differentiation, in which 
larger firms liked to have various different musical styles for different segments through a wide 
range of different labels and acts.  
Although precise systematic information on industry A&R expenditure is unavailable for 
the 1950s, it is possible to construct a proxy for the revenue-generating capacity of music by 
dividing the US recorded music sales by the number of copyrights registered for musical 
compositions (Figure 1). Real revenue per copyright jumped in the mid-1950s, clearly indicating 
the start of an escalation phase, and kept growing almost continuously, with a slight lull in the 
early 1960s. Real revenue per music copyright increased almost four-fold between 1955 and 
1970, from about $28,000 per new right to $96,000, a phenomenal average annual real 
growth of about nine per cent. Both revenue over new copyrights (the copyright registered in 
the particular year) and revenue over all musical composition copyrights ever registered showed 
the same trend. 
                                            
8 Bakker (2005). 
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The second tendency follows from the first. When entertainment products such as film 
tickets, music recordings or video games are sold, all development costs have already been 
incurred and marginal revenue therefore largely equals marginal (gross) profit. The marginal 
costs to a distributor of selling an additional CD to a retailer are small, making the marginal 
revenue of that sale almost equal marginal gross profit. Likewise, the marginal costs for a retailer 
for selling an additional CD are small, making marginal revenues largely equal marginal profits. 
With digital technology, marginal distribution costs have declined even further. 
Low marginal costs should lead to very low prices, and thus an inability to incur large 
fixed and sunk costs, were it not that companies are granted a monopoly through copyright 
law, and can use price discrimination to optimise the transfer of some of the consumer surplus 
into revenue. 
In an unintegrated value-chain in which master recordings are sold outright, the label 
manager or record producer’s incentive to increase quality is limited by the fact that s/he will not 
get any of the marginal revenues that their product generated for the distributor and for the 
retailer. The classic solution has been vertical integration or the use of revenue-sharing contracts. 
This construction aligns the interests of the participants in the various segments of the value 
chain, and so makes sure that marginal retail revenues reach the producer and artists, and this in 
turn gives the producer the incentive to make marginal improvements in product quality that 
will lead to additional sales, and thus more profits, also for the producer. 
Besides stimulating vertical integration, standard industrial organisation theory suggests 
that constant or falling marginal costs lead to an excessive number of firms. Together with low 
exogenous costs this can lead to an enormous product variety and a dual market structure. In 
the music industry, for example, there was a highly concentrated market for mainstream music, 
while low exogenous sunk costs and low marginal costs led to excessive entry in a second, 
separate, fragmented market with an almost infinite variety of firms, artists and music, each 
having a small market share.9 The latter market appears characterised by monopolistic 
competition: price is above the competitive level, but firms do not make economic profits.10 
Low marginal costs also lead to the word-wide exploitation of the results of sunk costs, 
even in tiny markets. However small the revenue, since marginal costs are extremely low, selling 
in those markets may still be profitable. 
The third tendency that shaped the industry’s evolution is that throughout time, music 
acquired ever more the character of a quasi-public good. It became ever more nondiminishable 
(nonrivalrous), but remained excludable. In a concert hall, for example, until capacity was filled, 
one additional person would not diminish the entertainment available to others, while one 
additional consumer of bread did diminish the quantity available.  
An almost continuous series of technological improvements made music even less 
diminishable. Sharp rises in concert hall capacity through steel-frame construction, and later 
recorded music and film massively increased the audience a performer could reach. Not only 
radio, television and internet would increase this even further, but also ‘older’ technologies such 
                                            
9 Mezias and Mezias (2000) borrow the term resource partitioning from biology to study phenomena not 
unlike both dynamic product differentiation and dual market structure discussed here. 
10 Chamberlin (1933); Robinson (1933). 
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as jet travel and large-scale stadiums. Between 1981 and 2003, for example, the top-1 per cent 
of live rock music performers received between 30 and 50 % of the total ticket revenue.11 
Yet music forever remained a quasi-public good: nondiminishable but excludable, unlike a 
pure public good such as national defence. Throughout the history of the music industry, 
entrepreneurs therefore developed business models that kept price above marginal costs by 
making them own the point where consumers could get excluded and extract all rents there. 
Five major business models were important. 
First, the entrepreneur could exclude visitors from a concert hall and so charge a price. 
They could physically exclude people and use their right to set prices to price-discriminate 
among visitors. Second, copyright allowed entrepreneurs a monopoly on their product.  
Third, the star performers themselves were an important group of entrepreneurs, who 
could withhold their services and thus exclude people, depending on the extent of their talent. 
Industrialisation made their performances tradable, and so increased stars’ earning capacity. The 
result was a very unequal distribution of income among the top performers, although we are 
lacking statistics to compare whether this was more unequal before or after the arrival of 
recorded music as a principle source of income for stars.12 The sharply unequal income 
distribution has remained a property of many media industries ever since. This made it also 
increasingly expensive for new music companies to recruit top talent. Entrepreneurs adopted 
various business models to mitigate this value capture by the stars. In the past often asymmetric 
multiple-record contracts were signed, and nowadays with revenues from recorded music sales 
diminishing, large record companies sometimes sign ‘360-degree contracts’, in which they share 
all of the artists’ revenues through all channels, including live performance and appearances in 
advertisements.13 
Fourth, production of diminishable goods such as merchandising that could be sold at a 
premium were used to generate revenue. Fifth, collusion could be a means of exclusion. During 
the 1950s, for example, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft and Philips’ Phonografische 
Industrie (Philips Phonographic Industries), two major European record companies that would 
later merge into PolyGram, had a far reaching formal agreement, in which they agreed not to 
bid against each others artists or bid jointly for new artists.14  
The long-run changes in the public-good nature of music have become exemplified by 
the fact that nowadays album sales have diminished and become less excludable because of 
copying technologies. The new business model depends on the remaining excludable parts, such 
                                            
11 Krueger (2005:14). Bakker (2012) shows how technological change in the film industry since the 1890s 
had a broadly similar effect. 
12 Bakker (2001); Rosen (1981). 
13 Something similar happened in the film industry, where in the 1910s the Hollywood studios introduced 
asymmetric long-term (‘seven year’) contracts that allowed them to keep stars’ pay limited when they 
became successful, European firms often used revenue-sharing contracts, which limited cash-costs, as 
pay-outs were only made when cash was coming in. In the late 1940s, seven-year contracts became 
unenforceable and a mix of advance payments and revenue-sharing is now widely used. See Bakker 
(2008). 
14 In the nineteenth century the global news agencies used detailed collusive agreements as well, to 
exclude non-payers (Bakker 2011).  Within motion pictures, in the 1920s the Hollywood studios formed a 
cartel and jointly monopolised resources, preventing any firm to bid up star pay. Since the US Supreme 
Court ended collusion and 7-year contracts in 1948, star pay has risen sharply. 
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as live concerts, diminishable goods such as T-shirts or deluxe CD-editions, or renting out artists 
to advertise other diminishable goods.15 
 
Diagram 1 Economic tendencies in the development of the post-war recorded music industry. 
 
Economic characteristic Dynamic implication Historical expression 
Sunk costs Quality race Mid-1950s to 1970s: escalation 
of A&R expenditure, acquisitions 
and marketing outlays 
Marginal revenue = marginal 
profits 
Vertical integration From 1950s: increasing 
integration mfg, recording, A&R, 
int. distribution and music 
publishing 
Quasi-public good character 
(non-diminishable but 
excludable) 
Exclusion-focused business 
models 
Income inequality (superstars) 
Long-term artist contracts 
Copyright extensions since 1970s 
‘360 degree deals’ in 2000s 
Project-based character Agglomeration Agglomeration of styles (e.g. 
Nashville, Chicago, Miami) and of 
music business (e.g. L.A. , New 
York, London). 
 
We have discussed the importance of endogenous sunk costs leading to quality races, of 
marginal revenues equalling marginal profits leading to vertical integration, and of music’s 
quasi-public good character leading to exclusion-centred business models and the economics of 
superstars (Diagram 1). We now turn to the fourth and final economic tendency: the project-
based nature of recorded music production that led to its agglomeration in a limited number of 
places. 
Each musical output, be it a composition, a performance or a record, is unique. The 
development of each output is a separate project with unforeseen contingencies, for which 
different creative, technical and commercial talent is assembled. Although every industry 
contains activities that are project-based, the proportion of it in music creation, as in most 
creative industries, is extreme (Diagram 2).16 
                                            
15 Krueger (2005). 
16 For an analysis of agglomeration effects of creative industries in general see Bakker (2010). 
  
3 
 
Diagram 2. Hypothetical representation of the boundaries of the project-based segments of the 
music industry and various other industries. 
 
The dynamic implication of the project-based character is agglomeration. Each musical 
project benefits from other projects being organised in the neighbourhood, much in the same 
way as Alfred Marshall described agglomeration benefits: within industries, co-location creates a 
thick market for specialised inputs, external economies of scale in production as specialised firms 
lower costs by spreading them over more buyers, and knowledge spill-overs, as talent meets 
informally, circulates between firms and exchanges best practices and ideas.17 
In addition, Janet Jacobs (1969) emphasised the importance of inter-industry externalities. 
Co-location of the music industry with other entertainment industries would yield similar 
benefits. In London, for example, music, film, radio, television and media financing companies 
may all benefit from being close to each other and therefore being able to better organise 
projects. Thus the agglomeration benefit spread at various different levels, and that makes them 
so important in the music industry. 
One of many potential diagrammatic representations of these interlinked Marshallian 
webs (Diagram 3) shows how each creative industry—such as film, music, videogames— which 
consists of a self-reinforcing ring of (functional) sub-sectors, while the project-based industries 
together also form a self-reinforcing super-ring. They mesh into one self-reinforcing Marshallian 
superweb of knowledge spill-overs, external economies of scale and thick markets for specialised 
services.  
                                            
17 See, for example, chapter 6 in Krugman and Obstfeld (2003). 
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Diagram 3. Stylised representation of the interlinked intra- and inter-industry webs of project-
based entertainment industries 
 
Many economic textbooks emphasize the scale economies in industrial districts (see, for 
example, Krugman and Obstfeld 2003). The argument is as above that many firms together 
reduce over-all costs through the thickness of factor markets, external economies and 
knowledge spillovers. The first music label founded in Aberdeen, for example, may have a far 
lower quality/cost ratio than the average quality/cost ratio for London or New York based music 
labels. However, if hundreds of music labels would set up shop in Aberdeen all at once, the, 
average quality/cost ratio might be far higher than in London or New York and a competing 
music district might emerge in Aberdeen. Yet because those first firms have far lower 
quality/costs ratios than the existing district, such a district does not emerge.  
Evidence shows that media industries are among the industries in which agglomeration 
benefits are highest. British media services, for example, had an agglomeration productivity 
elasticity of 0.22, meaning that if a music district would grow with ten per cent, productivity 
would grow 2.2 per cent without having to increasing inputs by more than ten per cent. This 
elasticity is about twice as large as the economy as a whole.18 A study of the London recorded 
music industry shows that despite technological innovations that facilitated business and creative 
contacts over long-distances, such as regular postal services, the telegraph, telephone, fax, and 
internet, knowledge spill-overs mainly emerge through frequent face-to-face contact, as that 
facilitates trust and informal knowledge exchange.19 A study by Scott (1999) finds evidence of 
strong agglomeration effects in the U.S. music industry, showing that New York and Los 
Angeles have a capacity to produce hit records that by far exceeds their relative significance in 
                                            
18 Graham (2006: 6-7). 
19 Watson (2008). 
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the number of recording companies, even after controlling for the presence of majors in those 
cities.20 
In music, then, agglomeration benefits have always been substantial, but not absolute. In 
Europe, capital cities were important locations. For most styles, location was part of the brand 
image, and the music industry therefore agglomerated not in one main location, like Hollywood, 
but in several separate locations, such as Nashville, Chicago or New York, with intra-industry 
agglomeration benefits for specific styles. 
The project-based characteristic contributed to this differentiation of locations. Also, 
because an industrial district lowered set-up costs, it could again lead to ‘excess’ variety. This 
meant that both the importance of falling entry costs and the agglomeration benefits in music 
creation stimulated an excess number of artists, entrepreneurs and firms, and so excess variety. 
It is remarkable that despite this tendency towards an infinite number of suppliers and almost 
infinite variety, just a few colossal multinationals came to dominate the international music 
industry after 1945. To how this was possible we will now turn. 
 
3. The long-run development of the international music industry 
During the interwar years, the combined effect of radio, talking pictures, and the 
depression triggered a sharp decline in demand for recorded music. Unlike film, music 
expenditure was highly sensitive to changes in income and was one of the first items consumers 
dispensed with.21 Consequently, several music companies merged. In the 1920s, the Columbia 
Graphophone Company, a British firm, was the industry’s major integrator. It bought its 
eponymous former U.S. parent as well as the German multinational Carl Lindstrom and the 
French multinational Pathé.22 In 1931 Columbia merged with the other British multinational, the 
Gramophone Company, to form EMI.23 The German firm Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft (a 
forerunner of PolyGram), which had started as a subsidiary of the Gramophone Company but 
became independent in 1917, had a limited international presence.24 Its overseas market 
declined during the Nazi period.25 The United States counted two major record enterprises: the 
first, RCA Victor, a division of the Radio Corporation of America, was formed in 1929, when 
RCA bought the Victor Talking Machine Company.26 The second, CBS Records, was owned by 
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS).27 
The exception to the trend of interwar decline and retreat was Decca Records of Britain. 
Decca originated in the family firm Barnett Samuel & Sons, a maker of watches, steel pens, 
instruments, and music boxes founded in 1832. Beginning in 1910 and continuing through the 
                                            
20 Scott (1999). 
21 Bakker (2010). 
22 Jones (1985:93–97); Gelatt (1977: 257). 
23 Martland (1997). 
24 In 1917, the German assets of the Gramophone Company were seized by the German government and 
sold to local interests. See Martland (1997). 
25 Fetthauer (2000). 
26 Ibid. 
27 From 1938 onward; see Table 2. In 1931 American Columbia had been sold by its British owners to 
Grigsby-Grunow, a U.S. manufacturer of radios and refrigerators. In 1933 the latter went bankrupt and 
Columbia was bought by the American Record Corporation, an industry consolidator. Gelatt (1977: 255); 
Chanan (1994: 66). 
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1920s, it became a large manufacturer of portable gramophones. In 1929 it bought the ailing 
Duophone Record Co. and built it into the Decca record company. The driving force behind this 
diversification was investment banker Sir Edward Robert Lewis. Originally the firm’s stockbroker, 
he became its major shareholder and eventually its chairman. In 1932 Lewis bought the U.S. 
record company Brunswick (which claimed Bing Crosby as its leading star) and made it into the 
American branch of Decca. Decca aggressively marketed a limited number of stars and sharply 
cut record prices on both continents, under the slogan “Leading Artists—Lower Prices”, and 
also adopted the juke box as a major and profitable new business model. By the end of the 
1930s, Decca had become the prime U.S. record company in popular music.28 It was the only 
integrated record firm to grow rapidly during the depression years and challenged the 
incumbents on both sides of the Atlantic. Significantly, Decca was forced to divest its successful 
US subsidiary during the war.29 
 
Figure 2. Real recorded music sales and industrial concentration, in real dollars and per centage 
of the market, United States, 1940-2005. 
 
Note: the first part of the series of concentration data is from the US Bureau of the Census, the 1990s data from the trade press. 
These may not be fully comparable. Retail sales have been deflated using the U.S. consumer price index deflator as reported by 
Officer (2009). 
 
Sources: Recording Industry of America; Harker (1980: 223-224); IFPI (1990: 61); Vogel (2004: 505). 
 
After the Second World War demand for music increased significantly. In the United States, it 
grew at the rate of 6 per cent per annum in real terms between 1945 and 2001, and at the rate 
of 10 per cent annually between 1945 and 1978 (Figure 2). Major growth spurts occurred in the 
periods 1955-1959, 1964-1969, 1976-1978, and 1984-1994. In Britain, the music market 
expanded at a rate of 9 per cent per year between 1955 and 1978 (Figure 3).30 It experienced 
                                            
28 Davenport (1985: 757–60). 
29 See also Bakker (2010). 
30 For a business history analysis of the UK music industry see Ibid. 
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growth spurts from 1952-1957, 1963-1964, 1969-1973, 1977-1978, 1983-1989, 1993-1996 
and 1999-2001.31 
 
Figure 3. Real UK music expenditure, 1930-2009, in million of real pounds. 
 
Note: Expenditure has been deflated using the U.K. retail price index deflator as reported by Officer (2011). 
 
Sources: “The demand for Gramophone records. A review of Gramophone record sales between the years 1905 and 1951,” 
Controller's Department - Economics Section, 1 August 1952; Managing Director Minutes, “Statistics mailed to Statistical 
Department,” EMI Archives, Hayes, Middlesex; British Phonographic Industry Association; Entertainment Retailers Association 
Yearbooks, as reported in Bakker (2010: 52). 
  
Most other Western countries showed similar real growth rates.32  As the market 
widened, new distribution channels were added, such as convenience-store racks, record clubs, 
and superstores. These in turn further enlarged the market in a self-reinforcing process. After 
television had taken over expensive programming for mainstream mass audiences, radio stations 
increasingly programmed music (which was relatively inexpensive) for narrower audience 
segments.33 Because distribution capacity had expanded and the market had become more 
sizable, musical products no longer had to appeal exclusively to the lowest common 
denominator. Their increased differentiation caused the market to be sliced up even more.  In an 
interactive process, this stimulated the development of distinctive musical styles, initiating and 
encouraging further compartmentalisation of the market. 
In attracting so many new entrants, the industry’s pronounced market growth initially 
dissipated its concentration. In the United States during the 1950s, for example, most 
Hollywood studios set up record subsidiaries, and many other entrepreneurs entered the field.34 
The market share of the four largest firms—CBS, RCA, Decca, and Capitol—fell from 79 per 
                                            
31 For a brief business and economic-historical analysis of the recorded music industry in Britain, see Bakker 
(2013). 
32 Harker (1980: 223–27). Nominal market size, in current dollars and pounds, has been deflated using the 
consumer price index for both countries. 
33 Peterson and Berger (1975: 158–73, esp. 164–65).  
34 Ibid. 
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cent in 1947 to 47 per cent in 1972 (Figure 1).35 Three factors, however, had a countervailing 
effect on concentration while simultaneously stimulating multinationalisation.36  
First, the expanded market increased the value of the rents generated by copyrights, thus 
adding an incentive to maximise and capture them.37 Therefore, companies turned away from 
exports and licensing—which had become prevalent between the wars—in order to conduct 
transactions within the firm; they went about this by setting up their own foreign subsidiaries, 
just as they had done between the 1900s and the 1920s.38 
Second, rapid market growth added an incentive to create new copyrights, which 
increased the value of A&R companies that specialised in this activity. Vertical integration 
between such companies and international distributors benefited both parties because the 
broader range of musical genres required more finely tuned, specialised marketing knowledge, 
which made both activities more dependent on each other. A highly specific distribution and 
marketing organisation had little value without good music, and vice versa.39  
A third factor was that greater product differentiation and a more stratified market made 
it more difficult to start foreign A&R companies from scratch. These three factors helped to 
accelerate national and international merger-and-acquisition activity (Tables 1 and 2)  and 
eventually forced the industry to become more concentrated. 
In the United States, for example, after 1972 the concentration ratio of the four largest 
firms rose again nearly as sharply as it had fallen (Figure 1). At that time, these firms were, in 
order of market share, CBS, Warner Music, RCA, and EMI/Capitol.40 The ratio grew to between 
60 and 70 per cent during the 1990s, when PolyGram, Warner Music, EMI, and Sony/CBS 
dominated, and it climbed even higher at the turn of the century.41 Paradoxically, as 
concentration increased, musical styles became more varied, a phenomenon that was 
encouraged by the emergence of a decentralised, “federated” structure for A&R activities. A 
few large multinationals became federations of dispersed, relatively small A&R organisations 
feeding into a global distribution organisation that guaranteed access to the market and 
captured rents.42 
 
                                            
35 U.S. Bureau of the Census (1947, 1972). 
36 Undoubtedly, political factors also played a role. In the interwar years sharp ideological differences and 
declining artistic freedom inhibited music’s international transferability, while after the war the Western 
countries had become more aligned politically and ideologically. 
37 The idea of rents is important to understand the evolution and structure of music multinationals; it will 
be discussed briefly below. 
38 On the possibilities and limitations of transaction cost economics for analysing the music industry see 
Gander and Rieple (2004). 
39 In economic terms, the distribution system became more asset-specific, i.e., it became so specialised 
toward the music distributed through it, that it could hardly be used for any other purposes, and would 
fetch a low price if sold to a non-industry buyer. Even so, the value of the music-copyright assets was 
increased because of the specialised knowledge within the distribution organisation, and these 
music/copyright assets would have substantially lower value to a firm that did not own a distribution 
system. On asset specificity, see Williamson (1985).  
40 Chapple and Garofalo (1977: 191). 
41 For a business history case study of PolyGram see Bakker (2006). 
42 For a case study on A&R, music publishing, and the capturing of rents by smaller Dutch companies, see 
also Carroll, Mol and Wijnberg (2005). 
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Table 1 
 
Major Mergers and Acquisitions in the Music Industry, 1929–2011a 
 
    Share Real value  
Year   Buyer Target (%) ($million)b 100%: 
1929  RCA Victor Talking Machine Co. 100 1,287  
1931  Columbia U.K. Gramophone Company Mergerc n/a  
1950/62/72  PPId Deutsche Grammophon Merger n/a  
1962  MCA Decca Records, Inc.e,f  Merger n/a  
1966  Kinney Corporation Warner Brothersf 100 1,443  
1979  Thorn EMI Ltd.f,g 100 706  
1986  Bertelsmann RCA Records 100 463  
1987  Sony CBS Records 100 2,732  
1989  PolyGram A&M Records 100 586  
1989  PolyGram Island Records 100 568  
1989  Investors–IPO PolyGramf 20 400 2,000 
1990  Time-Life Warner Communicationsf  100 17,159  
1990  MCA Geffen Records 100 662  
1990  Matsushita MCA Universalf 100 7,513  
1992  EMI Virgin Music 100 1,108  
1995  Seagram MCA Universalf 80 6,188 7,735 
1998  Seagram PolyGramf   100 11,035  
2002  BMGh Zomba Records 75 2,636 3,515 
2003  BMG Sony Music Merger n/a  
2003  Edgar Bronfmani Warner Music 100 2,453  
2005   Investors–IPO Warner Music 20 490 2,450 
2006  Universal Music BMG Publishing 100 1,803  
2007  Terra Firma EMI Music 100 7,000  
2011  Access Industries Warner Music 100 2,581  
2011  Sony EMI Music Publishing 100 1,721  
2011  Universal Music EMI record division 100 1,486j  
Sources: PolyGram Archives, trade press, business press, literature on industry; Bakker (2006, 2010). 
a Deals with a value of more than c. $400 million are included.  
b All values are real values in millions of constant dollars for the year 2000, GDP-deflated using Johnston and 
Williamson (2010). 
c The merged company was called Electric & Musical Industries (EMI). 
d PPI = Philips Phonographische Industrie NV. After the ownership merger in 1962 the combined PPI-
Deutsche Grammophon was named the Grammophon-Philips Group. After the operational merger in 1972 
it was named PolyGram. 
e Decca Records, Inc. merged with Universal-International Pictures in 1952. 
f The target includes film and/or television divisions. 
g Was preceded by a failed bid of Paramount Pictures of $299 million for 50 per cent of EMI Ltd. 
h BMG = Bertelsmann Music Group. 
i  Edgar Bronfman refers to Edgar Bronfman Jr. and a group of private investors 
who jointly took over Warner Music. 
j The actual value might have been higher, as seller Citigroup agreed to take on 
EMI pension fund liabilities.   
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Table 2 
Various Medium-Sized Acquisitions by Multinationals in the Music 
Industry,1920–2004 
       
     Share Real value 
Year   Buyer Target   (%) ($million)a 
 
Before 1960 
1920  Victor Talking Machine Co. Gramophone Company   47 63 
1924  Columbia U.K. American Columbia   100 21 
1925  Columbia U.K. Carl Lindstrom  100  
1927  Columbia U.K. Pathé Frères  100  
1932  Decca Ltd. Brunswick Records  100  
1933  American Record Company American Columbia   100 1 
1938  CBS Columbia   100 7 
1955/61  EMI Ltd. Capitol   100 92 
1957  Paramount DOT Records   100 10 
 
1960s 
1962  PolyGram Mercury Records  100 9 
1963  Warner Reprise   67 55 
1966  ABC Records Dunhill Records  100 13 
1967  Warner Atlantic   100 82 
1967  Warner Ashley Famous Agency  100 42 
1967  PolyGram RSO  100 33 
1968  PolyGram Chappell  100 171 
1969  ATV Northern Songs   100 91 
1969  GRTb Chess Records   100 31 
 
1970s 
1970  Warner Elektra   100 36 
1971  Warner Asylum   100 24 
1972  CBS Records Stax   100 23 
1972  PolyGram MGM Records (including Verve)  100 n/a 
1972  PolyGram United Distribution Corp.  100 n/a 
1976  EMI Ltd. Screen Gems Music Publishing   100 58 
1977/80  PolyGram Casablanca Film and Records Works  100 51 
1979  MCA ABC Records   100 81 
1979  Bertelsmann Arista Records   100 101 
1979  EMI Ltd. United Artists Records   100 6 
1979  PolyGram Decca Ltd.  100 60 
 
1980s 
1983  RCA Arista   50 n/a 
1984  ATV Majority of copyrights to Beatles songs   100 103 
1986  PolyGram Dick James Music  100 56 
1986  SBK Entertainment Music publishing of CBS Records   100 175 
1986  MCA Front Line Management/Full Moon Records   100 22 
1987  Warner Chappell   100 383 
1987/97  PolyGram Go! Discs  100 36 
1988  MCA Motown Records   20 81 
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1989  Sony Tree International   100 53 
1989  Warner Birch Tree   100 32 
1989  Fujisankei Virgin Records  25 240 
1989  PolyGram Welk  100 32 
1989  PolyGram Polar + Sweden Music  100 32 
1989  EMI SBK Publishing  100 429 
1989/91  EMI Chrysalis Records   100 179 
   
 
1990s    
1990  Warner CBS Record Club   50 382 
1990  EMI Filmtrax Catalogue   100 141 
1991  PolyGram Really Useful Holdings  100 199 
1991  PolyGram CD factories Hannover/Louviers   100 108 
1992  Carlton Communications Pickwick Records  100 145 
1992/96  Sony Creation Records   49 30 
1993  PolyGram Nippon PhonoGram  35c 26 
1993  PolyGram Motown Records  100 341 
1994  Sony ATV Music   100 116 
1994  Warner CPP/Belwin   100 23 
1994  BMG Ricordi   73 332 
1994  EMI Intercord  100 95 
1994/97  PolyGram Def Jam  100 139 
1995  PolyGram Rodven Records  100 62 
1996  MCA Interscope Records   50 213 
1996  BMG Fun House   100 96 
1997/04  EMI Jobeted  100 316 
1999  EMI Fuji-Pacific Music Inc.e  100 204 
 
2000s 
2000  Universal Music Rondor Music   100 350 
2000  BMG Napster   100 60 
2003  Universal Music DreamWorks Records  100 95 
2004   JDS Capital DreamWorks Music Publishing   100 42 
Sources: PolyGram Archives, trade press, business press, literature on industry; Bakker (2006,2010). 
a Real value is in millions of constant dollars of the year 2000, GDP-deflated using Johnston and Williamson (2010). 
b GRT was a manufacturer of audio tape and cartridges 
c The 35 per cent PolyGram did not already own. 
d The firm owns copyrights to Motown songs; EMI acquired 50 per cent in 1997, 30 per cent in 2003, and 20 per 
cent in 2004. 
e EMI acquired the rights to 40,000 songs of Fuji-Pacific Inc. 
 
This handful of multinationals, such as Warner, PolyGram, EMI, and BMG, came to 
dominate the music industry worldwide. Their most important activities were distribution, A&R, 
and music publishing. The international distribution system comprised physical assets and 
specialised knowledge.43 Within countries, their physical assets consisted of distribution centres, 
national distribution headquarters, and capital investment in inventory. International assets 
comprised the multinational’s headquarters and manufacturing capacity, which was not equally 
                                            
43 A general overview of record marketing/distribution is Hull (2004: 169–205). 
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spread across countries. These networks required large, fixed outlays and showed substantial 
economies of scale. 
To operate on a national level, the companies needed practical knowledge to establish 
and maintain well-oiled logistics systems that delivered the right records to the right outlets at 
the right time; they had to understand pricing conventions; and they had to be informed about 
the reputation of market parties, institutions, and contractual intricacies. Internationally, they 
needed efficient logistics; they had to know how to minimise taxes through transfer pricing; and 
they had to be familiar with the reputations of institutions and business people in foreign 
countries. 44 
Even more important to their success was the possession of intangible marketing 
knowledge, which, on a national level, meant having a grasp of the music that appealed to each 
demographic group, broken down according to gender, age, income, and location.  Armed with 
this knowledge, the companies had to be able to uncover and keep track of the channels 
through which these groups made their purchases—such as general or specialist music retailers, 
discount stores, supermarket racks, and record clubs—and they then had to find out which 
outlets within each channel were preferred by which customers.45 To this newly gathered 
knowledge, they added the accumulated experience of past marketing campaigns. 
Internationally, they had to be aware of the kind of music that was popular in each country.46 
In contrast to music distributors, most U.S. food distributors, for example, did not expand 
abroad, because their systems and knowledge were tied to their locations.47 Within the music 
industry, international expansion did take place, because horizontal integration of national 
distribution systems in one firm yielded economies of scale. Moreover, vertical integration of 
A&R units with distributors in other countries enabled fast international distribution. Speed was 
important, because hits had a short life cycle. Vertical integration also prevented local 
distributors from siphoning off the revenues generated by the copyrights, and aligned the profit 
incentives of the multinational and the label.48 
The second important activity of music multinationals entailed the output of artists and 
the creative repertoire. In economic terms, A&R was similar to R&D.49 The outlays on A&R 
                                            
44 Transfer pricing involves locating activities in tax-efficient production countries and setting internal 
international prices in such a way as to incur most taxable income in the countries with the lowest 
corporate taxes. In the case of PolyGram, one can think of the location of its record and CD 
manufacturing and its music-publishing vehicles. CD factories, for example, were amongst others, located 
in Germany, France and the US. The prices charged to various destination countries could take into 
account relative taxation and tariffs. 
45 Similarities exist with alcoholic-beverage firms. Lopes (2002) has shown that as marketing knowledge of 
these companies accumulated over time, the acquisition of brands gained increasing strategic relevance. A 
major difference was that brands needed national registration, advertising, and maintenance. Unlike 
music, they did not have a preexisting inherent value for markets where they had not been established 
yet. 
46 General industry sales data can be obtained externally, but this is no substitute for detailed, 
disaggregated internal sales data and qualitative judgment about consumer tastes, which were  important 
because the industry involved the constant launch of new products. Given the short product life cycle of 
music, obtaining information through the market could take too long and make the data obsolete. Bakker 
(2001, 2003) makes this point for the film industry. 
47 Caves (1996). 
48 See also Caves (2000). Assuming in-company compensation systems brought part of the marginal 
revenues generated by the label’s extra effort back to the label. 
49 See the introduction to this article. 
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reached levels that were similar to the ratios of R&D to sales in R&D-intensive industries. 
Between 1989 and 1993, for example, the five large music multinationals sank, on average, 22 
per cent of their sales revenue into A&R.50 
Acquisition of an A&R company (a ‘label’) initiated a two-way flow of knowledge: the 
multinational collected data about the countries in which the label’s music could be profitable, 
and the label was informed about which foreign music would sell well locally.51 By gathering 
information on the international market, the multinational made itself better informed than 
other potential buyers about a label’s worldwide value. Moreover, owning labels was a better 
guarantee of supply for the system than contracts.52 An acquired label yielded knowledge about 
the local value of artists and genres; the label’s market segment; the national A&R market; the 
various market parties; and the local rules, conventions, and institutions.  After its first takeover 
in a country, the multinational was in a better position to make subsequent acquisitions.53  
The third important activity was music publishing. This involved managing and enforcing 
rights and marketing existing copyrights to potential users, such as producers and entertainers.54 
Because costs were largely fixed, the acquisition of each subsequent catalogue reduced average 
costs substantially and thus yielded economies of scale. Publishing operations enabled the 
multinational to reap profits from its own labels and distribution networks and to gain a portion 
of the profits generated by its outside customers.55 Moreover, a copyright in a musical work 
often had a far longer economic life span than the copyright of a particular recording—the 
former ranged between 70 and 95 years after the creator’s death, the latter between 50 and 70 
years after the date of the recording.56 
Since a copyright is fixed after its creation and constitutes a monopoly, the revenues it 
generates can be considered rents, not unlike the rents on a piece of land, which is also a fixed 
quantity.  The total value of these rents depends on the effort of all participants in the value 
chain, and the distribution of this total value depends on the relative strength of each 
participant in the  chain.  A participant who owned a scarce resource, such as a music-
distribution  organisation or, in the 1980s, a compact-disc factory, was able to corner a large 
share of the total rents generated by the copyright. If none of the participants had any particular 
strength, rents would be low and the consumer would receive the benefit, by paying lower 
prices.57   
                                            
50 It ranged from a minimum of 20.4 to a maximum of 25.1 percent, with an average of 22.2 percent. 
Calculated from Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1994: 167–73). Cf. the R&D/sales ratios in Sutton 
(1998). 
51 Overviews of A&R management are Hull (2004 : 123–48); and Hennion (1981). 
52 Trautwein (1990) underlines the crucial importance of private information in acquisitions. See also 
Penrose (1959: 153–96). 
53 See also the remarks above about the label’s ability to capture rents and the alignment of incentives. 
54 An overview of music publishing is found in Hull (2004: 69–96). 
55 On international flows of royalty payments, see Kretschmer, Baden-Fuller, Klimis and Wallis, (2000). 
56 Hull (2004: 75). In the Western world the prevailing copyright protection of musical works increased 
during the period from about 50 to about 70 years after the death of the creator. In the United States, in 
2000 corporate authorship, which often covers sound recordings, was increased to 95 years after 
publication or 120 years after creation, whichever comes earlier. In 2011, the European Union increased 
copyright in sound recordings from 50 to 70 years after the date of the recording. 
57 Since, in the music industry, copyright owners always are in  a strong position (because they have the 
monopoly on the particular copyright), this situation does not apply to the modern music industry. 
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The circumstance that certain assets only had value in combination with other assets, i.e. 
the occurrence of asset specificity, stimulated vertical integration.58  The international 
distribution network, for example, was fully equipped to distribute music; without music, it was 
worthless. A&R and music publishing, in their turn, were worthless without the distribution 
network. When new audio standards were launched, the manufacturing capacity they required 
was very specialised, making it of little value for any other purpose (unlike hardware factories, 
which could easily switch from manufacturing one type of hardware to another).  
Thus, the first few firms to own the scarce new plants could secure part of their 
competitors’ profits by manufacturing their LPs or CDs and charging them high prices, since 
those competitors had nowhere else to go until more companies began to manufacture the new 
audio products.59 In this way, for example, Philips and Sony profited handsomely from the 
compact disc, since for a few years they were the only firms with CD factories.60 Their ability to 
corner the CD market decreased sharply over the course of the product’s life cycle, however, as 
more firms built their own factories.61 
In economic terms, then, a music multinational created revenue-generating assets in the 
form of copyrights and contracts with artists who would generate copyrights. It owned location-
specific creative units—“labels”—that produced these assets, not unlike multinationals making 
foreign investments in order to extract natural resources.62 Whereas resource multinationals 
extract, for example, metal ore to use in their production process, music multinationals “extract” 
unique assets (copyrights). A multinational does everything to exploit these assets to the limit 
and to maximise its worldwide profits. Although created locally, the intangible asset’s revenue 
could be generated globally.63 A global distribution network that combined local marketing 
knowledge enabled the multinational to better assess in advance the risks and expected 
international variability of a copyright’s revenue-generating capacity. By combining these assets, 
a multinational could realise economies of scale and scope and diversify risk.64 
In short, the music multinationals that emerged after 1945 were rights-based. They linked 
dispersed, idiosyncratic A&R units, creating portfolios of innovations (protected by temporary 
legal monopolies) within a global distribution system. This organisation guaranteed market 
access and cornered the revenues of the major markets. It sold products whose marginal costs 
were minimal and whose marginal revenues roughly equalled marginal profits.  Thus, since most 
of their costs were fixed, each additional sale added little to these costs; as a result, a large part 
of the added sales revenue equalled additional gross profits. The principle that marginal 
revenues translate into marginal (gross) profits is an essential feature of industries with high 
fixed and/or sunk costs (see above). These multinationals specialised in exploiting their existing 
rights—whose supply by definition was fixed—and in creating new rights whose rents they 
would be able to capture. 
                                            
58 On asset specificity, see Williamson (1985). 
59 See, for example, McGahan (1993). 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Jones (1996: 68–99), who introduces the term “resource multinationals.” 
63 Even the ”local assets” were important because they helped PolyGram’s distribution network reach 
minimum efficient scale, and the labels linked to these creative assets gave it valuable local marketing 
information. 
64 Sedgwick and Pokorny (1998) argue that within the film industry production costs are most meaningful 
when considered as portfolios rather than individual films. 
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To build these large multinational organisations large amounts of long-term cash were 
needed. Because much of this was sunk in intangible assets that could not easily function as 
collateral for bank loans or reassurance for investors, there was a practical need to get access to 
long-term cash. Almost all successful rights-based multinationals received this from the cash 
flow of their parent companies (Diagram 4). EMI and PolyGram, for example, both were owned 
by parents making electronic hardware, while Warner Music was attached to the eponymous 
Hollywood studio. BMG Music was set up with cash flows from the Bertelsmann media 
company, and MCA was developed by its parent, the Hollywood studio Universal. 
Second, almost all successful rights-based multinationals enjoyed some form of synergy 
with their parents. The early EMI, PolyGram, and the late Sony Music enjoyed synergies with 
hardware parents, while the other companies benefited from synergies with media parents 
(Diagram 4). Third, almost all successful rights-based music multinationals could piggyback on 
the existing multinational organisation of the company that owned them. Philips and Siemens, 
for example, instructed their foreign hardware subsidiaries to help set up foreign music 
subsidiaries. The only exception was CBS Records during its internationalisation in the 1960s. 
However, it had a strong existing position with abundant cash flow and eventually owners with 
deep pockets and some synergies. 
Thus it is clear that setting up a music multinational was not easy. The survivors were 
developed by parents that could give them long-term access to cash, knowledge and synergies 
with an existing business, and an actual multinational organisation, including the know-how 
needed to run it.  
 
4. How the federated form developed 
From the mid-1950s to the 1970s, the increasing proliferation of genres and the 
fragmentation of the market called for more specialised record labels and for marketing directed 
to narrower audiences.65 This situation favoured a decentralised A&R structure. Before the 
1950s, music had been a standardised product geared to a relatively homogenous taste, but 
products were becoming more differentiated, and the market was far more 
compartmentalised.66 
                                            
65 On diversity in musical output see, for example, Gourvish and Tennent (2010). 
66 Peterson and Berger (1975: 169–70), discuss the increasing product differentiation and emergence of 
subsidiary labels during the 1960s and early 1970s. Chandler Jr. (1977), discusses the role of product 
differentiation in General Motors’ strategy to unseat Ford as market leader, yielding insight into the role 
of product differentiation in industry dynamics. 
  
3 
Diagram 4. Provenance of cash needed for sunk outlays of rights-based multinationals and several non-
surviving music companies. 
 
Rights-based multinationals 
 Provenance of cash Synergy Capabilities 
EMI Own cash flow 
Shareholders 
Other businesses Thorn-
EMI 
Hardware Pre-existing Multinational 
Enterprise (MNE) 
organisation of parent 
PolyGram Early: Cash flow Philips 
and Siemens  
Late: own cash flow  
IPO/shareholders  
Hardware Pre-existing MNE 
organisation of parent 
Warner Music Cash flow film division 
Later: own cash flow 
Late: private investors 
Shareholders/IPO 
Media: Film Pre-existing MNE 
organisation of parent 
CBS Records Own cash flow Early: broadcasting (CBS) 
Later: advertising (Coca 
Cola) 
Late: hardware (Sony) 
No pre-existing MNE 
BMG Cash flow Bertelsmann 
Later: own cash flow 
Media: Book clubs 
Media: Broadcasting 
Media: publishing 
Pre-existing MNE 
organisation of parent 
MCA/Universal Cash flow film division 
Later: own cash flow 
External private investors 
Shareholders 
Media: Film 
Media: TV production 
Pre-existing MNE 
organisation of parent 
    
Non-survivors 
RCA Cash flow conglomerate Hardware  
Decca Investors; own cash flow Hardware No pre-existing MNE 
organisation 
MGM Records Cash flow from film 
division 
Media: Film Pre-existing MNE 
organisation of parent 
United Artists Records Cash flow from film 
division 
Media: Film Pre-existing MNE 
organisation of parent 
Fox Music Cash flow from film 
division 
Media: Film Pre-existing MNE 
organisation of parent 
Virgin Records Investors; own cash flow (Brand name) No pre-existing MNE 
organisation 
Geffen Investors; own cash flow None No pre-existing MNE 
organisation 
DreamWorks Records Investors; founders-
entrepreneurs 
Proceeds from sale 
Geffen Records 
Media: Film No pre-existing MNE 
organisation 
 
Not all of the existing record companies were equally well equipped to adapt their 
resources, capabilities, and routines to the changed environment. Traditionally, before the mid-
1950s they were managed under a unified creative organisation. The survivors, however, were 
either small labels targeting specific consumers, or large enterprises that decentralised 
themselves into separate A&R units. The latter became federations of creatively independent 
labels fine-tuned to particular audiences and linked to a global distribution system. This 
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emerging decentralised A&R structure encouraged music diversity.67 Between 1970 and 1990, 
for example, the average number of labels per record company more than doubled (Figure 4).68 
 
Figure 4. Average number of labels per firm in the US recorded music industry, 1970-1990, 
based on top-100 singles and albums. 
 
Notes:  Dotted line = labels per firm in the top-100 albums 
 Thin line    = labels per firm in the top-100 singles 
Bold line    = average of the labels per firm in the top-100 albums and the top-100 singles 
 
Source: calculated from Lopes (1992). 
 
The federated organisational structure emerged in an interactive, self-reinforcing 
process.69 Market growth led to more distribution channels, and more channels, in their turn, to 
even more growth. The increase in distribution capacity alleviated the need to focus on the 
lowest common denominator and therefore enabled additional product differentiation.70 By the 
early 1970s, for example, convenience-store racks had become an important outlet, particularly 
in the United States.  During the 1970s, specialised music stores proliferated and became part of 
chains. During the 1980s and 1990s, super-sized megastores and specialised radio stations 
followed. Better measurement technology enabled a more accurate estimation of a recording’s 
airtime share, which increased the number of different songs that were played.71 On the 
production side, technological innovations caused recording costs to decline sharply, enabling 
new artists, new musical styles, and small companies to enter the market.  
                                            
67 Lopes (1992); Dowd (2000) Some older, nonquantitative sociological works include Richard A. Peterson 
and Berger (1971) and Hirsch (1975). For a cultural studies perspective, see Negus (1999). 
68 It increased from 1.7 to 3.7 labels per record company. See Lopes, “Innovation.” 
69 The term “federal” or “federation” has been used before to characterise the emerging structure of 
record distribution. See, for example, Huygens (1999: 126–29); Baden-Fuller, Huygens, Van den Bosch 
and Volberda (2001). 
70 See the previous section. Likewise, the advent of television had increased audiovisual distribution 
capacity, thus further differentiating motion pictures and radio to target specific and narrower (especially 
younger) audience segments, while the television networks focused on the lowest common denominator. 
71 Hull (2004: 90). 
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In the multidivisional structure, or M-form, the central management makes the 
entrepreneurial decisions, and the divisional managers make operational and managerial 
decisions. Within the emerging rights-based multinationals, strategic and entrepreneurial 
decisions were made for the corporation as a whole; operational and managerial decisions were 
made for each national distribution system, and creative-entrepreneurial matters were decided 
for each label.72 The label manager generally had all the responsibility for creative performance 
and sometimes owned part of the label. This meant that each label was in charge of signing or 
cancelling acts and—in coordination with country managers—controlled their international 
distribution. 
Early pioneers of the decentralised A&R structure were PolyGram, which bought a string 
of labels from the early 1960s onwards, including Mercury, MGM Records, Verve and RSO, and 
Warner Music, which purchased the Reprise, Elektra/Asylum, and Atlantic labels (Table 2). 73 The 
companies that survived the shift in the business environment generally did not attempt to 
merge the managements of acquired firms. Doing so could have eliminated the entire creative 
function of both labels, affecting their brand image among consumers and their professional 
reputation among artists. Only when a label experienced large losses would its creative 
independence be ended. This was generally not done by merger, but was achieved by closing 
the entire outfit and transferring copyrights and artist contracts to another label, which is how 
PolyGram folded Casablanca, Go!Discs and Motown, for example.74 The guaranteed residual 
value of past copyrights and contracts attenuated the risk of buying a label. Whatever 
happened, at least some residual value whose future revenue streams could be estimated would 
remain.75 
Where the M-form generally had been adopted by firms in order to organise organically 
developed businesses into divisions, the federated structure emerged largely by self-
organisation: independent entrepreneurs founded their own labels and—if these were 
successful—sold out to a multinational.76 Not often did a multinational set up a new “greenfield 
label.” There was therefore a strong evolutionary component to the federated structure, or F-
form: many, if not most, of the labels died. More than the M-form, the F-form was as much 
dependent on evolution as on rational design. This ensured that multinationals like PolyGram 
and Warner gained access to unique resources and capabilities the characteristics of which could 
not be predicted. 
The surviving rights-based multinationals typically bought many smaller local companies, 
rather than a few large ones. To retain the firms’ value, the takeovers had to be friendly and the 
managers had to remain part owners. The labels gave the multinational better expertise to 
anticipate future markets and to act swiftly when entering new fields. The large multinational 
                                            
72 On the M-form, see, for example, Chandler (1977). For a detailed case study, see Arnold (1997). On 
PolyGram’s corporate culture, see also Negus (1999: 67–68). 
73 For a business history case study of PolyGram see Bakker (2006). 
74 Ibid. 
75 Unlike patents, copyrights had a long life span, could not be circumvented and could not be made 
obsolete by competitors. With a patent, a rival and newly patented product can be introduced that 
achieves the same purpose, such as a pill that lowers cholesterol using a different chemical as an existing 
medicine. With copyrights, this cannot be done, as it is the final expression that is protected. The value of 
copyrights varied substantially over time, but unlike patents, many retained an important residual value. 
76 On the role of self-organisation, see Dosi, Nelson, and Winter (2000). 
  
3 
would know how to hire the right people or buy the right companies at the right price.77 Each 
A&R acquisition gave it additional know-how and made subsequent takeovers easier.78 
Labels had a distinct geographic origin and location—part of their reputation and brand 
image—but they often marketed their music globally and prominently featured its local and 
cultural specifics.79 Paradoxically, a label needed local roots to have a global reach. Motown 
Records, for example, had strong roots in the U.S. Midwest and specialised in Afro-American 
music, while its music was sold worldwide. The geographic ties facilitated the adoption of the F-
form. They stimulated autonomy by separating units from the rest of the company and helped 
to attract artists. Within the M-form, by contrast, the different hierarchies of managers could 
share the same office.80 Without the federated structure, large creative companies would have 
found it difficult to turn out different styles that were geared to a variety of demographic 
groups. Ironically, in contrast to the M-form, most of the day-to-day operational routines were 
moved from the labels to functional departments/divisions. The remaining label duties were 
creative and entrepreneurial.81 
Entrepreneurial decisions about functions and general strategies were left up to the 
central management, which also made decisions on issues that transcended individual labels, 
such as the spectrum of labels to maintain; whether to buy, hold onto, or close a label; how to 
combine information pertaining to different labels; and how to ensure that the labels’ activities 
conformed to corporate strategy. 
Rights-based multinationals transferred knowledge from the whole distribution system to 
the labels. Ownership of the system also gave a multinational the advantage of having 
information that was not available to bidders lacking their own distribution system during 
takeovers, allowing the company to estimate the label’s expected performance and to figure out 
how well it would fit into the distribution organisation.82 
One reason for adopting the federated structure was the importance of fixed (A&R) costs 
compared to variable costs. This meant that a disproportionate part of the additional sales 
revenue generated by an increased A&R effort became additional gross profits (see section 2, 
above). This made the A&R and marketing functions all-important. They faced a maximum 
efficient scale and scope and could only be integrated by a decentralised, federative 
organisational structure. 
Not all music companies were able to adapt to the changing business environment and 
evolve a rights-based organisational model. Most Hollywood studios, for example, sold their 
record labels during the 1970s. RCA lagged behind and ceased to be an independent company 
                                            
77 This connects to Simon’s (1993) ideas on the importance of R&D in giving a firm the capabilities and 
people to interpret the changing business environment. 
78 Again, this connects to Trautwein’s (1990) point about private information. 
79 On location-specific advantages and the multinational enterprise, see Rugman and Verbeke (2001). On 
location as part of brand image, see, for example, Merrett and Whitwell (1994) and Wilkins (1994). See 
also Lopes (2002). 
80 Chandler Jr. (1962). 
81 See, for example, the Island case, discussed below. 
82 Trautwein (1990) underlined the importance of private information. Penrose (1959) and Chandler 
(1962), observe that the growth of firms is often driven by a desire to put slack resources to productive 
use. A multinational’s distribution organisation could be considered such a slack resource. 
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in the 1980s.83 A prominent failure was Decca. As its managers aged, the company lost touch 
with the changes taking place in the industry.84 Having declined merger proposals by 
Philips/PolyGram in 1945, 1947, and 1961, Lewis finally agreed to sell Decca records to 
PolyGram in 1979 for a mere five million pounds. He died a few days later.85 
 
5. The model of the rights-based multinational 
Table 3 recapitulates the entry of the various rights-based multinationals. It shows how 
after the war only one organisation could be characterised as a global multinational, with a 
presence in all major music markets, and a proto-rights-based structure, whereas at the height 
of the post-war music industry, during the CD-boom in the mid-1990s, six such gigantic 
organisations existed. The sale of PolyGram for more than 10 billion dollars in 1998 illustrates 
the uniqueness of these rights-based multinationals and the enormous value investors attached 
to them. One property that made investors willing to pay a premium for rights-based 
multinationals in the music industry was entropy: although a rights-based organisational 
structure could be dismantled or merged in a matter of weeks, it took decades, sometimes a 
century to build them. Elimination of one of them, as happened with the subsequent merger of 
PolyGram with MCA Music, was irreversible in the short term. 
 
 
Diagram 5 gives a schematic overview of the typical structure of rights-based music 
multinationals as it emerged after 1945 and as we have discussed above.  
                                            
83 Huygens (1999: 124). 
84 Davenport (1985). 
85 Ibid. The initial £5.5 million could rise to £15.5 million, depending on Decca’s performance after 
takeover. The Decca acquisition by its former Dutch licensee was not unlike the takeover of the Columbia 
Graphophone Company of the United States by its former British subsidiary half a century earlier, in 1925. 
Table 3. Global MNEs in the music industry since 1945
Period No. Name No. Names
1940s 0 1 EMI
1950s 1 PolyGram 1 EMI
1960s 2 Warner; CBS 2 EMI; PolyGram
1970s 0 4 EMI; PolyGram, Warner, CBS
1980s 1 BMG 4 EMI; PolyGram, Warner, CBS
early 1990s 1 MCA 5 EMI; PolyGram, Warner, CBS, BMG
late 1990s 0 6 EMI; PolyGram, Warner, CBS, BMG, MCA
1999 -1 PolyGram 5 EMI, Warner, CBS, BMG, MCA/PolyGram
2003 -1 BMG 4 EMI, Warner, CBS/BMG, MCA/PolyGram
2011 -1 EMI 3 Warner, CBS/BMG, MCA/PolyGram/EMI
Note : As EMI already was a multinational with a global reach before 1940, it is identified as an incumbent in this table
CBS Records was renamed Sony Music after acquisition; MCA/PolyGram was named Universal Music.
The 2011 takeover announcement of EMI by Universal Music (MCA/PolyGram) is subject to regulatory approval.
Sources : see text
Entry / exit Incumbents
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Diagram 5. The value chain and the boundaries of the firm in the music industry.  
 
Notes: the relative horizontal size of the value-chain stages reflects the relative scarcity of the activity. For example, there are more 
labels than global distribution organisations. 
Int. rep. centre = international repertoire centre; the function of multinationals that coordinates the marketing of a particular kind of 
repertoire on an international scale.  
 
To recapitulate, the rights-based multinationals had three main properties. First, the high 
endogenous sunk costs in the development and marketing of recorded music, and the low 
marginal costs of reproducing music, led to marginal revenues almost equalling marginal profits, 
thus creating an incentive to keep spending on music development and marketing until the last 
dollar spent equalled the last dollar received. This led to an incentive structure in which lots of 
artists, managers and entrepreneurs who had some control over how well the music would sell, 
had per centage contracts to align their incentives. 
Second, limited economies of scale and scope existing in A&R: at some point, spending 
more money on a label would not lead to significantly better acts. Therefore the rights-based 
multinationals managed a portfolio of various different labels focusing on different musical 
styles and genres and often in different locations. 
Third, paradoxically in their other activity, distribution, the multinationals experienced 
large economies of scale and scope, and therefore they had an incentive to create global 
distribution ‘machines’ that maximised throughput and so lowered unit costs. The trick that 
every rights-based multinational needed to pull off was to link the distribution machine 
intelligently to the labels. And this was easier said than done: where six organisations 
succeeded, many other ones failed and are forgotten. At the present day, four rights-based 
multinationals remain, which are likely to be reduced to three, if the planned takeover of EMI’s 
record company by Universal Music in 2011 obtains regulatory approval. 
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6. Conclusion 
Few other industries have faced more radical changes than the recorded music business 
has confronted since 1945. Many companies failed to cope and disappeared as independent 
organisations. A handful of singular firms managed to adapt their strategies and organisational 
structures to the new environment. Along the way, they combined the assets of firms less able 
to adapt, such as RCA, Decca, Mercury and MGM Records, with those of smaller, younger firms, 
reconfiguring their acquisitions into large international federations. 
This paper showed how, first, endogenous sunk costs led to a quality race, expressing 
itself in increasing A&R expenditure since the mid-1950s. Second, the fact that marginal 
revenues equalled marginal profits, combined with rapid market growth led to increasing 
vertical integration since the 1960s. Third, the quasi public good character led to income 
inequality among the artists as a whole and among the stars, and it also prompted the 
development of new business models that focused on points where revenue could be captured, 
such as physical sound carriers, live concerts, merchandising, broadcaster fees and performance 
rights. Fourth, the project-based character of music led to decentralised agglomeration with 
strong agglomeration benefits. Many music styles had their own geographic location where 
most of the music was developed 
Rights-based multinationals were internationally vertically integrated organisations that 
married minimum economies of scale and scope in distribution with maximum economies of 
scale and scope in A&R. From the mid-1950s these multinationals joined the quality race, using 
their own cash flows and those of their parent companies. They played a key part in developing 
a business model that allowed them to capture  most of the rents to musical copyrights. Dealing 
with the project-based character, they owned subsidiaries in most of the important industrial 
music districts in the world. 
Rights-based multinationals adopted a decentralised, federated A&R structure, moving 
creative and entrepreneurial decisions to several entities within the organisation. The lower part 
of this federated structure, or F-form, emerged through self-organisation. The A&R units often 
were pre-existing companies that had survived a commercially and creatively competitive process 
before they were acquired. Dispersed around the world, they had strong local roots, but they 
developed products for a global market and were linked to a distribution system that captured 
the rents of their copyrights on a global scale. The transition to the multidivisional A&R structure 
helped to promote the growth of multinationals by allowing an increase in the size of firms in 
creative industries beyond what had once been thought possible.  
Pioneers PolyGram and Warner were closely followed by EMI and later by Sony Music 
(CBS), two older firms that eventually managed to adapt to the new environment, unlike some 
of their peers. From the 1980s onward, BMG, and then MCA, built and expanded multinational 
organisations. By the late 1990s, these six rights-based multinationals had come to dominate 
the entire industry. Ironically, while this concentration of power worried some people, there had 
never before been so many music multinationals. The F-form ensured that rising concentration 
could proceed hand in hand with increasing diversity of musical styles. 
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